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Abstract: The introduction of \e￿ort inducible" and \no e￿ort" workers into a standard
labor discipline model results in a paradox of sorts: if ￿rms/capitalists cannot tell the
di￿erence, the predictable reductions in both output and workers compensation lead to an
increase in pro￿ts. The resolution is found in the di￿erence in expected productivities of
workers with and without contracts, which creates a reputation e￿ect. When the relative
proportions of workers are made variable - the consequence of the acquisition and depreci-
ation of productive skills, and a source of positive feedback - the model exhibits multiple
equilibria for plausible parameter values.
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1. Introduction
Are there conditions under which ￿rms or capitalists could ever bene￿t from incomplete in-
formation about workers’ abilities or job-related preferences? Consider a modi￿ed Shapiro-
Stiglitz (1984) model in which capitalists cannot distinguish between two sorts of workers,
those who could (and would, for su￿cient incentive) expend some predetermined level of
e￿ective e￿ort ￿ e, and those who could not. 1 The expected mean productivities of those with
and without jobs will then di￿er in the model’s pooled equilibrium, and this di￿erence can
be interpreted as the reputation cost of job loss . Other things being equal, the existence of
such costs increases the punishment value of dismissal, and so shifts the balance of power
in labor markets, such that capitalists are sometimes made better o￿.
This view of reputation is reminiscent of Greenwald’s (1987, 325) seminal paper on
adverse selection in labor markets, in which ￿rms’ e￿orts to reduce the rate at which their
better workers turn over creates an environment in which \workers who change jobs are
* The earliest versions of this paper bene￿tted from conversations with Carolyn Craven,
John Geanakoplos, Benjamin Polak and David Weiman. The penultimate revisions were
completed as a visiting scholar at Yale and UC San Diego, with leave support from Middle-
bury College, and the ￿nal revision owes much to the detailed comments of Je￿ Carpenter
and two anonymous reviewers. The usual disclaimers hold.
1 In this context, e￿ort is e￿ective if its expenditure reduces worker welfare and produces
some minimum level of output.
1marked by being part of an inferior group, which lowers their future bargaining power and
wages." Greenwald’s (1987) explanation is not cast in terms of the e￿ort extraction/moral
hazard problem featured in this paper, but the antecedents of the two models - in Green-
wald’s (1987) case, the Salop (1979) model of turnover costs, and in this case, the Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) model of labor discipline - are both examples of the e￿ciency wage hy-
pothesis, as Yellen (1984) and others have underscored. These results will also remind some
readers of Levine’s (1989, 1990) work on just-cause employment policies in a modi￿ed labor
discipline model, in which such policies can sometimes increase ￿rms’ pro￿ts because the
negative externalities associated with (over)strict dismissal rules are, in e￿ect, internalized.
To the extent that reputation costs constitute one of the \scars" (Ellwood 1982) of job
loss, the calibrated version of the model described here also provides new perspective on the
econometric literature on the costs of displacement. Farber (1997) reminds us, for example,
that workers sampled in one or more of the biannual Displaced Worker Surveys (DWS)
between 1984 and 1992 reported an almost 15 percent di￿erence in earnings, a number that
understates the long(er) term costs. In an e￿ort to measure some of these costs, Jacobson,
Lalonde and Sullivan (1993) constructed a longitudinal data set for Pennsylvania workers,
and found that even 24 months after separation, displaced workers earned 30 percent less
than before, and that this di￿erence was persistent, a result consistent with Schoeni and
Dardia (1996), who studied workers in California, and Stevens (1997), who underscores the
importance of multiple job loss. Likewise, Hall (1996) concludes, on the basis of Ruhm’s
(1991) in￿uential PSID-based estimates, that the present discounted value of the lifetime
earnings losses following displacement is equal to 120 percent of the representative worker’s
average annual earnings.
2The next section describes a discrete time model of labor discipline in which a small
fraction ￿ of all workers are never able to expend e￿ective e￿ort, and draws attention to one
of its most important, if paradoxical, features: with the limited information available to
￿rms, total output (income) falls but is redistributed so that pro￿ts, both absolute and as a
share of national income, sometimes rise. The third section characterizes the comparative
statics of the model’s pooled equilibrium 2 for reasonable parameter values, and concludes
that in practice, wages and employment could be sensitive to the presence of such workers.
The existence of \no e￿ort" (hereafter, NE) workers needs to be rationalized, however,
and this is the purpose of the fourth section, which endogenizes the proportions of \e￿ort
inducible" (EI) and NE workers. In particular, I show that when (a) the NE/EI distinction
re￿ects di￿erences in productive skills, and (b) there is some likelihood that EI workers
without jobs will lose these skills, and some likelihood that NE workers with jobs will
(re)acquire them, labor markets will exhibit positive feedback and multiple equilibria.
The extended model bears some resemblance to Azariadis and Drazen’s (1990) formal-
ization of the notion of a threshold e￿ect in economic development though, as Topel (1999)
observes in his review of the literature, the required non-convexities in labor markets can
have other sources. 3 Within this framework, the deterioration of skills is a prerequisite for,
2 E￿ort inducible workers would prefer to signal this to ￿rms, and ￿rms would prefer to
induce self-selection, but whether, and how, this can be done is a current research question
- see, for example, Jullien and Picard (1998) and Albrecht and Vroman (1999).
3 Topel (1999) mentions Becker, Murphy and Tamura’s (1990) paper, for example.
3but not equivalent to, the existence of reputation costs. 4 The fourth section concludes with
an evaluation of the local comparative statics of the model’s interior stable equilibrium,
with particular attention to the e￿ects of variations in the deskill and reskill rates.
2. Workers, Capitalists and Equilibrium: A Benchmark Model
Suppose that there are (1 ￿ ￿)H identical and in￿nite-lived e￿ort inducible or EI workers,
each with discount rate ￿ and within period vNM preferences u(!;e)=! ￿ e, where !
is the real wage and e is e￿ort. At the start of each discrete period, EI workers who are
employed must decide whether to expend some minimum e￿ort level ￿e or to withhold their
labor power, in which case e = 0. There is some likelihood d that the absence of e￿ort is
detected in each period, and all detected workers are dismissed. 5 Since no EI workers shirk
in equilibrium, all EI dismissals violate the just cause principle (Levine 1989). To allow
for displacement, layo￿s and other turnover, it is also assumed that a proportion q of all
workers, EI or NE, who are not dismissed in a particular period will leave or be separated
for other reasons.
The incentive condition for EI workers is then determined on the basis of the poten-
tial lifetime utilities of those who expend ￿e and those who do not, denoted V1 and V2
4 For an alternative view, see Greenwald (1985).
5 This is less restrictive than ￿rst seems: within this class of models, capitalists will




! ￿ ￿ e + ￿qV3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)
(1)
V2 =
! + ￿(d + q(1 ￿ d))V3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)
(2)
where V3 is the welfare of an unemployed EI worker. 6 EI workers will not withhold e￿ort
if V1 ￿ V2 or, from (1) and (2), if:
! ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)
￿d(1 ￿ q)
￿
￿ e +( 1￿ ￿)V3 (3)
When this requirement is (just) met, V3 will itself be a simple function of V1 and the
likelihood a that unemployed workers are (re)hired at the start of the next period, V3 =
aV1=(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a).7 Substitution for V1 in (1) then implies that:
V3 =
a(! ￿ ￿ e)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ fd))
(4)
6 To derive the second of these conditions, for example, observe that the likelihood that
an EI shirker is separated from the ￿rm that hired her is equal to d+(1￿d)q, the sum of the
probabilities that she is detected d and not detected but leaves for other reasons q(1 ￿ d).
The likelihood that she remains employed is therefore 1 ￿ (d +( 1￿ d)q =( 1￿ d)(1 ￿ q),
and the application of Bellman’s Principle then implies that V1 = ! + ￿[(d + q(1 ￿ d))V3 +
(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)V1] which simpli￿es to (2). The derivation of (1) is almost identical.
7 To con￿rm this, observe that EI job seekers will receive an o￿er, and therefore V1, with
likelihood a, but ￿V3 with likelihood 1 ￿ a if current period income and e￿ort are assumed
to be zero in the event of an unsuccessful search.
5which, after much simpli￿cation, allows the incentive conditon (3) to be rewritten as:
! ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)
￿(1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ q)d
￿
￿ e (5)
This is a variant of the standard Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) no shirking condition (NSC) and,
as such, exhibits some familiar properties: the incentive that EI workers must be o￿ered
is a positive function of a and q, the probabilities of rehire and separation, and an inverse
function of the detection rate d.
The di￿erence between this and the usual NSC is that the presence of NE workers
in￿uences the likelihood that EI workers will be rehired. If there are N employed workers
each period, both EI and NE, and a proportion of these are NE, the total number of workers
who will lose their jobs at the end of each period is [ q(1 ￿ ￿)+(d + q(1 ￿ d))￿]N and, in
equilibrium, this must be equal to the number (re)hired at the start of the next. 8 In turn,
this implies that (1 ￿ d)(1 ￿ q)￿N NE and (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)N EI workers will retain their
positions from one period to the next, and that H ￿ [(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)+( 1￿ q)(1 ￿ d)￿]N =
H ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿d)N workers, both EI and NE, will be abailable for hire at the start of
each period. The common likelihood of rehire a must therefore be:
a =
[q(1 ￿ ￿)+(d + q(1 ￿ d)￿]N
H ￿ [(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)+( 1￿ q)(1 ￿ d)￿]N
=
(￿d + q(1 ￿ ￿d))n
1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿d)n
(6)
8 The likelihood that an employed EI worker loses her position at the end of a particular
period is q, while the likelihood that an NE worker does is d +( 1￿ d)q. It follows that
(d+(1￿d)q)￿N NE workers and q(1￿￿)N EI workers will be subtracted and, in equilibrium,
added to the number of employed workers each period.
6or the ratio of new hires to (start of period) job seekers, where n = N=H is the employment
rate. It then follows that for ￿xed N, the introduction of NE workers is associated with
an increase in the likelihood of rehire: (1 ￿ q)￿d more workers are hired 9 each period,
and the number of those without work falls the same amount, from H ￿ (1 ￿ q)N to
H ￿ [(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)+( 1￿ d)(1 ￿ q)￿]N.
The increased likelihood of rehire (for ￿xed N, recall) does not mean that EI workers
are able to obtain better terms, however. As demonstrated below, the proportion p of those
not employed at the end of each period who are NE will exceed ￿, the proportion of those
with contracts who are, and this reduces the post-displacement value of an EI worker’s
labor power. In heuristic terms, prospective shirkers must now factor a reputation e￿ect
into the punishment value of dismissal, which in turn undermines the bargaining position of
EI workers. To formalize this argument, observe ￿rst that the likelihood that a particular
worker is NE, conditional on membership in the start of period jobless pool, will be equal
to the ratio of the likelihood that she is NE and jobless to the likelihood that she is jobless,
and that this implies that: 10
p =
￿H ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)￿N
H ￿ [(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)+( 1￿ q)(1 ￿ d)￿]N
9 This is the di￿erence between the number hired when ￿ =0 ,qN, and the number
hired when ￿ 6=0 ,[ q(1 ￿ ￿)+(d + q(1 ￿ d))￿]N.
10 This condition can also be motivated as the constraint on the total number of NE
workers in equilibrium, and a companion to (8), a constraint on the number of NE workers
in the jobless pool.
7=
￿H ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)￿N
H ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿d)N
=
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)￿n
1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿d)n
(7)
For the number of jobless NE workers to remain constant in equilibrium, a second condition
must also be satis￿ed: 11
p =
￿(d + q(1 ￿ d))
￿(d + q(1 ￿ d) )+( 1￿ ￿)q
=
￿(d + q(1 ￿ d))
￿d + q(1 ￿ ￿d)
(8)
Together, the last two conditions de￿ne the pair of implicit functions p = p(n) and
￿ = ￿(n) with three important properties:
(i) the proportion p = p(n) of those out of work at the start of each
period who are NE is a positive function of n, with p(0) = ￿ and p(1) =
￿(d + q(1 ￿ d))=(￿d + q(1 ￿ ￿d))
(ii) the proportion ￿ = ￿(n) of those employed each period who are NE
is also a positive function of n, with ￿(0) = ￿q=(q +( 1￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿)d) and
￿(1) = ￿, and
(iii) p(n) >￿>￿ (n) for n 2 (0;1)
Each of these properties can be rationalized. The third, for example, is consistent with the
observation that for each n, the likelihood q that employed EI workers will ￿nd themselves
11 To motivate (8), observe that there are ￿N employed NE workers at the beginning of
each period, of whom ( d+q(1￿d))￿N will either be separated, or detected and dismissed, at
the end of the same period. Since a proportion p of all those in the (start of period) jobless
pool, and therefore of all new hires, are NE, it follows that [ ￿(d + q(1 ￿ d) )+( 1￿ ￿)q]pN
NE workers will be hired each period. If these ￿ows are to o￿set in equilibrium, then (8)
must hold.
8in the jobless pool at the end of each period is (perhaps much) smaller than the likelihood
NE workers will. If the number of EI (or NE) workers who lose their positions and are
rehired each period are to o￿set one another, then the proportion ￿ of employed NE workers
each period must be less than the proportion p of job seekers who are also NE. The second
follows from the requirement that as n rises, so must the proportion of employed workers
who are NE, ￿, as more of the otherwise NE-abundant pool of job seekers is absorbed. An
increase in the proportion p of the jobless pool that is also NE will be associated with the
rise in ￿; however, and this is the intuition for the ￿rst.
For purposes of exposition, the labor demand shcedule is made as simple as possible:
successive doses of e￿ective labor power are assumed to increase output ￿￿ e units. Because
new workers are hired from the jobless pool, however, and a proportion p(n) of these are
NE, it follows that the incremental increase in output will instead be ￿￿ e(1 ￿ p(n)), where
individual capitalists treat p(n) as a datum. A pair of representative equilibria, with and
without NE workers, are depicted in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 About Here]
For the reasons mentioned above, the introduction of NE workers shifts the incentive con-
dition upward, from NSC1 and NSC2, and the labor demand schedule downward, from D1
to D2. The new NSC and D schedules intersect at E2, which means that workers with jobs
will earn less, !￿
2 instead of !￿
1, and there will be fewer jobs. In other words, the existence
of NE workers reduces and then redistributes national income from workers to the owners
of capital such that, in this case, total pro￿ts rise. (If workers are themselves the own-
ers/shareholders of these ￿rms, this will manifest itself as a reduction in household income,
but an increase in the proportion of this income collected in the form of dividends, etc.)
9Capitalists or ￿rms bene￿t from the presence of NE workers because of the di￿erence in
the productivities of workers with and without contracts: the last worker hired contributes
￿￿ e(1 ￿￿(n￿
2)) output but if, in order to signal dissatisfaction with the terms of her current
contract, she withholds her labor power, her expected contribution if (when) is detected
and dismissed falls to ￿￿ e(1 ￿ p(n￿




3. Comparative Statics for a Calibrated Benchmark Model
As the previous discussion hints, the comparative statics of NE workers are not di￿cult to
characterize in qualitative terms, but an evaluation of their practical importance requires
parameter values, some of which are di￿cult to calibrate. To start with the least contro-
versial choices, the rate of time preference ￿ and the separation rate q were set equal to
0.95 and 0.15. The former corresponds to a real interest rate of 5.2 percent in the absence
of ￿nancial market imperfections, and the latter is consistent with the adjusted ￿ow data
in Summers and Poterba (1986), but is smaller than the estimate in Abowd and Zellner
(1985).12 In the limiting case with no NE workers, the position of the horizontal MPL
schedule determines the wage !￿, so that ￿￿ e = 40 (thousand per annum) seems a reason-
able ￿rst choice. The values of the detection rate d and normalized cost of e￿ort ￿ e, about
which there is much less information, then determine the position of the NSC schedule and
therefore the equilibrium unemployment rate u￿ and likelihood of rehire a￿. Some trial
and error then lead to d =0 :60 and ￿ e = 5 as plausible ￿rst choices: the values of u￿ and
a￿ are then 4.5 and 76.2 percent, where the latter is equivalent to a mean jobless spell of
12 On the other hand, it exceeds the displacement rates reported in Farber (1997), which
￿uctuate between 10 and 16 percent between DWS samples.
1016.4 weeks.13 (For comparison purposes, the median annual wage of full-time workers 16
and over was 30 thousand in 2000, the unemployment rate was 4.0 percent, and the mean
jobless spell as 13.6 weeks. 14)
The in￿uence of ￿, the proportion of NE workers, is summarized in Table 1, which
reports the equilibrium values of the aforementioned !￿, u￿ and a￿, as well as ￿￿, the
proportion of workers employed each period who are NE; p￿, the proportion of those in the
jobless pool at the start of each period who are NE; and u￿
EI and u￿
NE, the EI and NE
speci￿c jobless rates, for values of ￿ between 0 and 10 percent.
[Insert Table 1 About Here]
It also lists the reduction in output, expressed as a fraction of total output in the limiting ￿ =
0 case, the share of this output that accrues to capitalists/￿rms in the form of supernormal
pro￿ts, and the value of R, the reputation e￿ect, measured in thousands of dollars per
annum.
The responsiveness of the equilibrium - in particular, both the volume and distribution
of output - to variations in ￿ is the most remarkable feature of Table 1. As the proportion
13 If these numbers are indeed reasonable, the calibrated model is consistent with Juster’s
(1985) view that for a substantial number of workers, the costs of job-related activities are
small.
14 These data are from the January 2001 issue of Employment and Earnings . The mean
wages for full-time male and female workers 25 and over, perhaps better reference popula-
tions, were 36.4 and 26.8 thousand, respectively.
11of NE workers in the labor force rises from 0 to just 2 percent, for example, the wages of
employed workers fall from 40 thousand to 37.1, a 7.25 percent reduction. Total output
falls much less than this, about 2.4 percent, but capitalists/￿rms receive 5.5 percent of
this reduced income in the form of windfall pro￿ts. The overall jobless rate rises, from 4.5
percent to 5.2, and with it, the rate for EI workers, to 4.9 percent, and NE workers, to 18.4
percent, while the likelihood of rehire falls a little bit, from 76.2 percent to 74.5.
The equilibrium values p￿ and ￿￿, central to the the characterization of labor market
behavior in this framework, are 7.2 and 1.7 percent, respectively. In other words, when 2
percent of all workers cannot expend e￿ective e￿ort, capitalists/￿rms soon learn that a little
more than 7 percent of all those available for hire each period exhibit this characteristic.
It follows that the expected productivities of workers with and without jobs will be ￿￿ e(1 ￿
￿￿)=3 9 :3 and ￿￿ e(1 ￿ p￿)=3 7 :1 thousand per annum, which in turn means that the
reputation cost of job loss R￿ will exceed 2000 dollars per annum, or almost 6 percent of
the representative EI worker’s wage income. It is this cost that EI workers must factor into
their e￿ort decisions.
As the proportion of NE workers is increased to 10 percent, on the other hand, output
is reduced (just) 12.1 percent, but the wages of employed workers fall almost 30 percent,
from 40 thousand per annum, to 28.6. The overall, EI and NE jobless rates rise to 8.4, 6.7
and 24.0 percent, while the likelihood of rehire falls to 67.7 percent, equivalent to a mean
jobless spell of more than ￿ve months! The substantial decline in compensation and the
smaller rise in EI joblessness suggests that for EI workers, the income e￿ect of NE workers
will dominate the jobs e￿ect in practice. The values of ￿￿ and p￿ are 8.3 and 28.5 percent,
12consistent with a reputation e￿ect of 8.1 thousand per annum, or almost 30 percent of the
EI worker’s reduced income.
As alluded to earlier, there are no empirical studies to motivate the choice of both
detection rate d and cost of e￿ort ￿ e, so some discussion of robustness is warranted. To this
end, Figures 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) are three-dimensional plots of the wage !￿, unemployment
rate u￿ and reputation e￿ect R￿ for values of d between 0.30 and 0.90, ￿ e between 2.5 and
7.5, with ￿￿ e still ￿xed at 40 and ￿ =0 :02 or 2 percent. (The intervals are the initial choices,
plus or minus 50 percent.) Figure 2(a) reveals that once the product ￿￿ e is ￿xed, variations
in either the detection rate or the cost of e￿ort do not have much e￿ect on compensation. As
expected, !￿ increases with ￿ e, but for d =0 :60, for example, it rises from 36.9 thousand, for
￿ e =2 :5, to just 37.3 thousand, for ￿e =7 :5. Likewise, for ￿ e =5 ,!￿ falls from 38.2 thousand
when the detection rate is (just) 30 percent, to 36.2 thousand, when it is 90 percent.
On the other hand, Figure 2(b) implies that the e￿ects on joblessless are more sub-
stantial. At one extreme, a low detection rate ( d =0 :30) and high cost of e￿ort (￿e =7 :5)
are associated with an unemployment rate of 16.1 percent; at the other, a high detection
rate (d =0 :90) and low cost of e￿ort (￿e =2 :5), with 1.7 percent. Figure 2(c) reveals similar
variation in the reputation cost of job loss R￿, from 1.0 thousand ( d =0 :30; ￿ e =7 :5) to 3.4
thousand (d =0 :90; ￿ e =2 :4), compared to 2.2 thousand in the benchmark ( d =0 :60; ￿ e =5 )
case.
The sensitivities of u￿ and R￿ to variations in d and ￿ e is cause for some concern, but
there is little evidence that the initial parametrization is unrealistic.
134. On the Existence of NE Workers: An Extension of the Benchmark Model
There are at least two broad explanations for the existence of NE workers. The ￿rst follows
from the observation that unemployed EI workers will sometimes become NE. The simplest
reason this could occur is that separation causes ￿rm- or sector-speci￿c human capital to be
lost, a phenomenon featured in empirical work on displacement since Hamermesh (1987)
and Topel (1990). The slow(er) erosion of more portable skills could also produce this
transformation. The adverse psychological e￿ects of joblessness are a third possible expla-
nation: Darity and Goldsmith (1996) ￿nd, for example, that unemployment is associated
with measurable damage to workers’ well-being, and that productivity is a function of,
among other things, this well-being. In a similar vein, Oswald (1997) ￿nds evidence that
joblessness is a source of substantial \non-pecuniary distress." If, in this context, all of these
are understood to mean an increase in the likelihood of failure, where failure is understood
to mean the expenditure of ine￿ective and therefore unobservable e￿ort, some workers will
then ￿nd it rational, in the sense of (3), to withhold e￿ort altogether.
The second explanation turns on the identi￿cation of NE workers as those with sub-
stantial extra-market opportunities and/or wealth: the better a worker’s default position,
the smaller the punishment value of dismissal, and therefore the more substantial the in-
centives that the capitalist/￿rm must provide to induce the required e￿ort level.
To sketch an extension of the model that incorporates the ￿rst of these possibilities,
suppose that EI workers are as before, but that NE workers have the vNM preferences
u(!;e)=! ￿ ke, where k>1 is such that NE workers will, for reasonable values of !,
choose e = 0: NE workers ￿nd it (much) more di￿cult, in other words, to provide e￿ective
e￿ort ￿ e. Furthermore, suppose that there is some likelihood z2 that an unemployed EI
14worker will become NE after one period, but that a proportion z1 of employed NE workers
will become EI, despite the expenditure of no e￿ective e￿ort. (The second of these is less
learning by doing, then, than remembering by observing.) In heuristic terms, z1 and z2 are
the rates at which workers are reskilled and deskilled.
Even with attention restricted to pooled equilibria, the characterization of labor market
transitions - in particular, the determination of p, ￿ and now ￿ - becomes complicated, as
the ￿ow chart in Figure 3 attests.
[Insert Figure 3 About Here]
The requirement that the number of employed EI workers be constant in equilibrium in
each period, for example, can be expressed as:
a(1 ￿ p)S + z1(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)￿N = q(1 ￿ ￿)N (11)
where
S = H ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)+( 1￿ d)(1 ￿ q)￿]N = H ￿ (1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ ￿d)N (12)
is the number of those without work at the start of each period, before capitalists have
replaced lost workers. The derivation of (11) follows a familiar line: of the (1 ￿ ￿)N
EI workers employed each period, a proportion q will be separated from their jobs, which
implies that q(1￿￿)N EI workers will join the jobless pool at the end of the period, which is
the right hand side of (11). The number a(1￿p)S of EI workers hired from this now swollen
pool, the product of the rehire rate a and the stock (1 ￿ p)S of EI job seekers, should not
be equal to the number separated, however, because a fraction z1 of the (1 ￿q)(1￿d)￿N of
the NE workers employed in the previous period who were neither separated nor dismissed
will become EI, and the sum of these two ￿ows is the left hand side.
15Likewise, for the numbers of employed NE workers and unemployed EI workers to
remain constant from one period to the next, it must be that: 15
apS =[ z1(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)+(q + d(1 ￿ q)]￿N (13)
and:16
a(1 ￿ p)S = q(1 ￿ ￿)N ￿ z2(1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ p)S (14)
It is convenient to replace (11) or, if one prefers, (13) with a linear combination of the two:
a =
[(q + d(1 ￿ q))￿ + q(1 ￿ ￿)]N
S
(15)
which then de￿nes the likelihood of rehire in the modi￿ed model.
Substitution for a in (11) then implies that:
p =
z1(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)￿ +(q + d(1 ￿ q))￿
(q + d(1 ￿ q))￿ +(q + fd(1 ￿ q))(1 ￿ ￿)
(16)
15 If (11), (13) and (14) are satis￿ed, then as a matter of addition, the number of unem-
ployed NE workers will also be constant.
16 The ￿rst of these (13) asserts that the number apS of NE workers hired each period
must o￿set the number of NE workers who are either separated and dismissed and the
number of NE workers who are neither but become EI at the end of the period. The second
requires that the number of EI workers who are hired, and therefore leave the jobless pool,
must equal the sum of the number of EI workers who are displaced and the number of EI
workers who are deskilled.
16This establishes a connection between p, ￿ and the reskill rate z1 that is, perhaps surpris-
ingly, not a function of the total number of workers N employed each period. Substitution
for a and S in (14), on the other hand, leads to:
z2 =
pq(1 ￿ ￿)N ￿ (1 ￿ p)(q + d(1 ￿ q))￿N
(1 ￿ p)(H ￿ N)
(17)
Given the likelihoods z1 and z2 that workers are reskilled and deskilled, and the number
of employed workers N, (16) and (17) determine the proportions p and ￿ that are consistent
with ￿ow equilibrium, and (15) then determines the likelihood of rehire a. There is no
stock condition for the proportion of NE workers in the entire labor force because ￿ is now
determined within the model:
￿ =
pS +( 1￿ q)(1 ￿ d)(1 ￿ z1)￿N
H
(18)
(As a matter of de￿nition, a proportion p of the number S of job seekers at the start of
each period are NE, while the number of NE workers who remain under contract from one
period to the next is (1 ￿ z1(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d) ￿ (q + d(1 ￿ q)))￿N or, after simpli￿cation,
(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)(1 ￿ z1)￿N.)
It is still the case that p>￿>￿for each N, and it is not di￿cult to show that the
values of p and ￿ consistent with (16) and (17) are now decreasing functions of N. That
is, as the number of employed workers N rises, the proportion ￿ of these who are NE, and
the proportion p of start-of-period job seekers who are NE, both fall. To see this, observe
that (16) implies that p and ￿ will rise and fall together, and that (17) implies that as both
rise, N must fall, and vice versa.
This means that even as the individual capitalist confronts what is to him or her a
horizontal MPL schedule, the labor demand schedule for all capitalists now slopes upward.
17If, as con￿rmed below, the incentive condition for EI workers retains its basic shape, there
will now be three equilibria for reasonable parameter values, two stable and one unstable,
as depicted in Figure 4a.
[Insert Figures 4a and 4b About Here]
The positive slope is a consequence of the positive feedback mechanism that is now built
into the model: as the volume of employment N increases, the proportion ￿ of NE workers
in the labor force now falls as workers who would have otherwise remained NE are reskilled.
In turn, this pulls downs the shares ￿ and p of NE workers with and without jobs which is
su￿cient, under some conditions, to \deconvexify" production. 17
Viewed from another perspective, each new hire produces positive externalities. A
proportion p of new hires will be NE and, of these, a proportion 1 ￿ z1 will remain so
from this period to the next - even if some, perhaps most, are returned to the jobless pool,
some will remain at work. The remainder, a proportion z1 of new NE hires, will reacquire
previous skills at the end of the period, but of these, a proportion q will nevertheless return
to the jobless pool at the end of the period, where other ￿rms will hire some of them
without what are, in e￿ect, training costs. (The ￿rm will also retain a fraction 1 ￿ q of
these reskilled workers, and so capture some, perhaps most, of the bene￿ts of reskilling for
themselves.)
17 What di￿erence would diminishing, as opposed to constant, returns to e￿ective labor
make? Intuition suggests that the MPL function would then be hump-shaped. For small
values of N, the reskill e￿ect should dominate, but as N tends to H, the returns e￿ect
should. If so, the essential properties of the model are una￿ected.
18To derive the e￿ort incentive condition for EI workers, note ￿rst that the lifetime
utilities V EI
1 and V EI
2 of workers who were e￿ort inducible at the start of each period
remain, mutatis mutandis, as described in (1) and (2), so that (3) still constrains the ￿rm’s
o￿ers to such workers. The calculation of V EI
3 , however, the welfare of a (for the moment,
at least) EI worker who is unemployed becomes more complicated. The EI worker who
is separated from her current employer at the end of a particular period will now receive
another o￿er, and therefore receive V EI
1 , a percent of the time, will not receive an o￿er and
remain EI, with welfare ￿V EI
3 , with likelihood (1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ z2), and, most important, will
neither receive an o￿er nor remain EI (that is, become deskilled) with likelihood (1 ￿a)z2,
in which case ￿V NE




1 + z2(1 ￿ a)￿V NE
3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a)(1 ￿ z2)
(19)
To determine the value of V NE
3 , the lifetime welfare of NE workers without contracts, note
￿rst that such workers will ￿nd a position, and receive ￿V NE
2 - not, it should be noted,
V NE
1 , since NE workers are assumed not to expend e￿ective e￿ort, which implies that V NE
1
must be less than V NE
2 - with likelihood a, but will not ￿nd a position, and therefore receive
￿V NE





1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ a)
(20)
The value of V NE
2 is, in turn, dependent on V EI
1 , V EI




! + ￿z1[(d + q(1 ￿ d))V EI
3 +( 1￿ d)(1 ￿ q)V EI
1 ]
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)(1 ￿ z1)
+
￿(1 ￿ z1)(d + q(1 ￿ d))V NE
3
1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ q)(1 ￿ d)(1 ￿ z1)
(21)
19(The derivation of (21) involves no new complications: the NE worker under contract
receives ! in the current period, but there is some likelihood z1(d +q(1 ￿d)), for example,
that she will be reskilled, but either be detected and dismissed, or separated for other
reasons, and then receive V EI
3 at the start of the next period, and so on.)
Combined, (1), (19), (20) and (21) comprise four linear equations in four unknowns -
V EI
1 , V EI
3 , V NE
2 and V NE
3 - and the substitution of the solution for V EI
3 into the incentive
condition for EI workers provides the required modi￿cation of (5).
Figure 4a, introduced earlier, depicts representative NSC and MPL schedules in this
three equilibrium case. For z1 =0 :80 and z2 =0 :10, for example, and the other parameter
values assumed in the previous section, there is a stable equilibrium, at u￿
1 =5 :44 percent,
an unstable one, at u￿
1 =7 6 :2 percent, and a second stable corner equilibrium, at u￿
3 = 100
percent. The last of these is not implausible if the model is recast as one with dual labor
markets, as in Bulow and Summers (1986). In their model, most of those who do not ￿nd
work in the primary labor market, de￿ned to be one in which e￿ort is di￿cult to monitor,
are absorbed into the secondary market, in which it is not. The corner equilibrium in
this model could therefore be interpreted as one in which (almost) everyone works in the
secondary market, rather than one in which no one is employed. This implies that the
relative sizes of these two markets are less determinate than sometimes supposed. That is,
a given set of preferences, endowments and methods of production are consistent, both in
principle and in practice, with either a vibrant or an atrophied high wage sector.
This pattern is reminiscent of the earliest neo-classical models (Solow 1956) of under-
development traps, in which the feedback mechanism assumed the form of an intensive
production function that was concave for capital-labor ratios below some threshold value,
20and convex above. Following Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and others, this model identi￿es
the labor market as a source of such non-convexities. In particular, if the volume of primary
sector employment falls short of the threshold associated with the unstable equilibrium -
for the parameter values assumed here, 23.8 percent of the labor force - the number of
workers who would exert e￿ort ￿e will be too small for the expected contribution of new
hires to exceed the incentive wage for EI workers. If employment then falls, however, still
more workers will be deskilled and the expected marginal product of a new hire to fall even
further and, no less important, faster than the incentive wage. In this environment, a state-
sponsored \big push" (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989), perhaps in the form of public
expenditure on primary sector output, is sometimes needed to ensure that employment in
this sector reaches critical mass or, to invoke Rostow’s (1960) famous metaphor, takes o￿.
It is important to note, however, that the three equilibrium outcome - in particular, the
existence of a stable equilibrium in which some, perhaps most, of the labor force is employed
in the primary sector - is not assured. If, for example, the reskill rate z1 remains 80 percent,
but the likelihood that a worker is deskilled rises to 40 percent, the relative positions of the
NSC and MPL schedules become those pictured in Figure 4b, in which case there will be
just one (stable) corner equilibrium, at u￿ = 100 percent. Under these conditions, there is
a permanent collpase of the primary sector. This collapse is a consequence of the increased,
and now substantial, likelihood that workers who enter the jobless pool are deskilled: when
there are few workers employed in the primary sector, there are numerous NE workers in
the jobless pool, and the expected marginal product of a new hire is low, but as the number
of workers employed increases, the decrease in the proportion of NE workers is more than
o￿set by the increase in the incentive-compatible wage.
21Figure 4b bears a strong resemblance to Mankiw’s (1986) representation of ￿nancial
market collapse, and this is not a coincidence. In Mankiw’s (1986) model of adverse selection
in credit markets, an extension of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), a rise in the interest rate is
associated with an increase in the riskiness of the pool of borrowers and, under some
conditions, there is no interest rate at which the expected rate of return is su￿cient for
banks to lend. Figure 4b depicts a similar breakdown in a contested labor market: in the
presence of adverse selection and endogenous skill formation, there will sometimes be no
employment level at which the expected return on a new hire will exceed the wage required
to induce e￿ective e￿ort.
It is the (local) comparative statics of variations in the reskill and deskill rates z1
and z2 for the stable interior equilibrium that are most relevant in the present context,
however. Even when such an equilibrium exists, however, the results are conditional on
the choice of parameter values. Consider, for example, an increase in the likelihood that
EI workers without (primary sector) jobs are deskilled. On the one hand, this causes the
modi￿ed MPL schedule to shift downward since, for each N, the proportion p of all workers
without such jobs who are NE will increase. Consistent with Figure 3a, this puts downward
pressure on both the wage !￿ and N￿. On the other hand, the modi￿ed NSC schedule will
also shift downward: the EI worker who withholds e￿ort now risks detection, dismissal
and the possible loss of skills, which increases the cost of job loss for ￿xed N and reduces
the incentive capitalists or ￿rms must provide to induce such e￿ort. This in turn tends
to increase the number of workers hired and, because of the positive feedback mechanism
embedded in primary sector labor markets, the wage !￿ each worker is o￿ered. The net
22e￿ects on both !￿ and N￿ turn, therefore, on the sizes of these shifts, and these are di￿cult
to predict a priori.
To see what these shifts could be in practice, Figures 5(a) through 5(g) are three-
dimensional plots of the equilibrium wage !￿, unemployment rate u￿, likelihood of rehire
a￿, proportion p￿ of all those not employed (in the primary sector) who are NE, proportion
￿￿ of all those employed who are NE, proportion ￿￿ of NE workers in the labor force as
a whole, and last, the reputation e￿ect R￿, for values of z1 between 0.75 and 1 and z2
between 0 and 0.35.
[Insert Figures 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 5e, 5f and 5g About Here]
(Recall that for values outside these intervals, the stable interior equilibrium is often lost.)
For reference purposes, the benchmark values are z1 =0 :80 and z2 =0 :10. In this case,
employed workers earn 35.6 thousand per annum, the overall jobless rate is 5.4 percent, the
rehire rate is 73.5 percent, equivalent to a mean jobless spell of 18.7 weeks, 11.0 percent
of those not employed (in the primary sector) are NE, 1.88 percent of those in it are NE
and 2.38 percent of the labor force as a whole is NE. The reputation cost of job loss is 3.65
thousand per annum, or 10.25 percent of the annual wage.
The most striking feature of these diagrams is how sensitive the equilibrium is to
variations in the deskill rate z2. In terms of Figure 4a, it seems that the ￿rst of the
aforementioned shifts is dominant. Holding the reskill rate z1 constant at 80 percent, for
example, the wage rate !￿ falls from 35.6 to 21.8 thousand as the deskill rate z2 from 10
to 35 percent. The unemployment rate u￿ more than doubles, from 5.4 to 12.2 percent, a
rise mirrored in the decreased likelihood of rehire, from 74 to 59 percent, equivalent to an
increase in the mean jobless spell from 18.2 to 36.1 weeks. At the same time, the reputation
23cost of job loss R￿ almost quadruples, from 3.65 to 14.2 thousand or 65 percent of the (now
reduced) wage rate. This in turn re￿ects a mammoth increase in the proportion of NE
workers in the jobless pool, from a little bit more than 10 percent to almost 50 percent.
The share of those with (primary sector) jobs who are NE also rises, from 1.88 to 9.76
percent, as does the share of NE workers in the labor force, from 2.38 to 14.1 percent. In
the extreme (z2 =0 :35) case, the dramatic di￿erence in the proportions of NE workers
with and without jobs means that the worker who withholds e￿ort - that is, contests the
exchange of labor power - risks joining a pool whose expected output is almost 16 (=
36 ￿ 20) thousand dollars lower.
The net e￿ect of variations in the reskill rate z1 are also the result of competing, but
in this case more or less equal, shifts of the modi￿ed NSC and MPL schedules. On one
hand, as z1 rises, the expected reduction in the proportion p of job seekers who are NE for
each N causes the labor demand schedule to shift upward, which causes both !￿ and N￿ to
rise, ceteris paribus. On the other, the incentive condition or NSC also shifts upward - the
punishment value of dismissal is reduced because the likelihood that workers who lose their
jobs but are later rehired (re)acquire lost skills rises, so that the incentve required to induce
e￿ort increases, too - which tends to drive !￿ and N￿ down. In the calibrated model, these
shifts almost o￿set one another. Holding the deskill rate ￿xed at 10 percent, for example,
the equilibrium wage !￿ increases from 35.4 thousand per annum to just 36.2 thousand as
z1 increases from 0.75 (75 percent) to 1.00. At the same time, the unemployment rate u￿
falls just 0.2 percentage points, from 5.5 percent to 5.3, while the rehire rate rises, from
73.3 percent to 73.9. It then comes as no surprise that the proportions of those in the labor
force, those with primary sector jobs, and those without such jobs who are NE all fall a
24little bit as the reskill rate rises, from 2.5, 2.0 and 11.4 percent to 1.9, 1.5 and 9.4 perecent,
or that the reputation cost of job loss also falls, but not much, from 3.8 thousand to 3.1.
What are the broader lessons of this exercise? First, that the destruction and ref-
ormation of human capital, which macroeconomists often treat as a long run or growth
phenomenon, can in￿uence labor market outcomes in the short and medium terms. Sec-
ond, that within this context, macroeconomists should devote as much attention to the
latter as the former: the results presented here indicate that labor market outcomes will
be sensitive to the rate at which displaced workers are deskilled.
It is also possible to calculate, for the same combinations of z1 and z2, the volume of
(primary sector) employment associated with the second or unstable interior equilibrium,
taking care not to run afoul of the correspondence principle. (The results are better in-
terpreted in terms of the sector’s minimum viable mass in di￿erent economies, and not as
variations in this mass.) The data are plotted in Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 About Here]
The data hint that economies with smaller likelihoods of deskilling, or slower human capital
depreciation, will have better - that is, more workers will be hired - stable equilibria and
smaller viable masses. (Recall that when the deskill rate increases even further, both
interior equilibria vanish, leaving just one (stable) outcome in which the primary labor
market is collapsed.) Figure 6 also reveals that similar bene￿ts - better stable equilibrium,
smaller minimum viable mass - also accrue to economies with high reskill rates.
255. Conclusion
The proposition that the presence of workers unable to expend e￿ective e￿ort will bene￿t
capitalists or ￿rms seems counterintuuitive until it is recalled that in practice, the punish-
ment value of dismissal often includes a reputation cost. If the Shapiro-Stiglitz model is
extended to include a small number of such workers, and these workers cannot be distin-
guished from their e￿ort inducible peers, a reputation e￿ect of sorts emerges in the pooled
equilibrium, in the form of a di￿erence in the mean productivities of workers with and
without jobs, a variation on Greenwald (1987). With this reputation e￿ect in place, both
the number of workers hired and total output will fall, but pro￿ts, both in absolute terms
and as a share of national income, rise. If the acquisition and deterioration of e￿ective
skills is then explicitly modelled, a positive feedback mechanism is established and with it,
the existence of multiple equilibria for plausible parameter values. Under these conditions,
the stable high employment equilibrium seems to be more sensitive to variations in the rate
at which workers are deskilled than reskilled, a result that underscores the importance of
recent empirical work on displacement.
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Figure 1: Labor Market Discipline with and without NE Workers
29Table 1. The Comparative Statics of NE Workers
Number of NE Workers, as a Percentage of the Labor Force
024681 0
!(th) 40.0 37.1 34.6 32.4 30.4 28.6
u 4.5 5.2 5.9 6.7 7.5 8.4
a 76.2 74.5 72.8 71.1 69.4 67.7
p 7.2 13.4 19.0 24.0 28.5
￿ 1.7 3.4 5.1 6.7 8.3
R(th) 2.2 4.0 5.6 6.9 8.1
Q Loss 2.4 4.8 7.3 9.7 12.1
Pro￿ts 5.5 10.4 14.7 18.6 22.0
uEI 4.9 5.3 5.7 6.2 6.7
uNE 18.4 19.8 21.1 22.5 24.0
Notes: All of the variables are as described in the text and, with the exception of compen-
sation ! and the reputation e￿ect R, which are measured in terms of thousands of dollars
per annum, are expressed in percentage terms.
30Figure 2a: Wages, E￿ort Levels and Detection Rates
31Figure 2b: Unemployment, E￿ort Levels and Detection Rates
32Figure 2c: Reputation Costs, E￿ort Levels and Detection Rates
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Figure 4b: A Collapsed Labor Market when the Number of NE Workers is Endogenous
36Figure 5a: Real Wages
37Figure 5b: Unemployment Rates
38Figure 5c: Likelihood of Rehire
39Figure 5d: Proportion of Jobless Who Are NE
40Figure 5e: Proportion of Those Employed Who Are NE
41Figure 5f: Proportion of Labor Force That Is NE
42Figure 5g: Reputation Cost of Job Loss
43Figure 6: Threshold Employment Rates
4445